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n important commitment made in the Uruguay Round of trade talks, and 
reflected in the Agreement on Agriculture (the URAA), was the conversion into 
ordinary customs duties of the plethora of non-tariff barriers that had previously 
characterised international trade in agricultural goods. This process was known as 
tariffication (Josling, Tangermann and Warley, 1996). 
Once the Uruguay Round had been completed, and the new tariff schedules 
established, a number of authors suggested that some countries had engaged in “dirty 
tariffication”. Ingco’s detailed calculations attracted most attention. She concluded: 
“The results indicate that the specific and ad valorem tariffs which many countries 
have set in their schedules are significantly higher than the wedge between actual 
domestic and world market prices in the base period, hence affording higher 
protection than prevailed in 1986-88” (Ingco, 1995, 22; 1996, 433). Ingco continued: 
“The extent of ‘dirty tariffication’ varied widely among countries and commodities. In 
many countries it appears to have occurred in the ‘sensitive’ commodities such as 
dairy, sugar, and grains. Among the industrial countries, the magnitude appears largest 
in the European Union and EFTA” (1996, 433). She reports results for rice, wheat, 
coarse grains, sugar, beef and veal, pork, poultry and dairy. Ingco’s work has been 
widely cited, for example by Hathaway and Ingco (1996), Tangermann (1996), 
Messerlin (2001), and Nogués (2003). Nogués claims that “In fact, dirty tariffs, are 
probably one of the most obscure episodes in the 50 plus years of the multilateral 
trade negotiations” (2003, 7). 
Discussion of dirty tariffication embraces both a narrow and a wide concern. For 
example, the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium notes that the 
term has sometimes been used “because the initial tariffs from which reductions start 
are often very high …” (IATRC, 1994, 18). This is a fairly broad statement. The 
IATRC explains that “In part this reflects the high rates of protection in agriculture.” 
But the consortium then suggests that “governments have often searched for price data 
for calculating base period tariff equivalents that result in high tariffs compared to the 
actual level of protection in the base period.” It is this latter, narrower, definition of 
dirty tariffication, which suggests that governments manipulated the data, that is 
addressed in this article. For example, for EU sugar, Ingco (1996) suggests that the 
tariff equivalent should have been calculated at 234 percent. Instead, she claims, the 
EU’s calculation came out at 297 percent, some 63 percentage points higher.  
It is widely recognised that the base period for tariffication, 1986-88, built into the 
calculations some of the biggest price gaps in recent history. Thus it is conceivable 
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that, even after the full implementation of the tariff reductions agreed to in the 
Uruguay Round, bound tariffs could still be higher than those in force immediately 
prior to the implementation of tariffs in 1995. Figure 1 shows that the world market 
price for sugar is indeed volatile, and that – expressed in U.S. dollars – prices were at 
a low in the period 1986-88. Ingco’s work suggests that over the period 1979-93 the 
EU’s tariff equivalent for sugar was 150 percent compared to the 234 percent she 






























































































Figure 1 Sugar in bulk, Caribbean ports, f.o.b. (US¢/lb.), monthly data, January  
               1960 to December 1999. 
         Source: UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin On-Line, www.unctad.org 
 
A further complication arose when domestic policy change was implemented after 
the base period 1986-88, with no corresponding adjustment to the tariffs calculated for 
the base period. For example, in the EU, the MacSharry reforms of 1992 resulted in a 
reduction in the intervention price for cereals and, by extension, the implicit support 
prices for pig and poultry products. Accordingly, for cereals (and rice) the EU agreed 
that the applied import duty would be capped. There was, however, no consequential 
adjustment to the tariff equivalents that had been determined for pig and poultry 
products.  
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What Were WTO Members Supposed to Do? 
T 
he process of tariffication is referred to only indirectly in the URAA. Article 4(1) 
refers to the tariff bindings and “other market access commitments” contained in 
members’ schedules; and Article 4(2) asserts that “Members shall not maintain, resort 
to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted 
into ordinary customs duties,” except in specified circumstances. It is the modalities 
document (GATT, 1993), reproducing almost exactly the language of the Dunkel text 
(GATT, 1991), which sets out the procedure.
1 
The modalities document notes that “The policy coverage of tariffication shall 
include all border measures other than ordinary customs duties,” and that “The 
calculation of tariff equivalents, whether expressed as ad valorem or specific rates, 
shall be made using the actual difference between internal and external prices in a 
transparent manner” for the years 1986 to 1988 (GATT, 1993, annex 3, section A, 
paragraphs 1 and 2).  
External prices were to be “average c.i.f. unit values for the importing country”; 
where this was not relevant, either the “appropriate average c.i.f. unit values of a near 
country” could be taken, or an external price could be “estimated from average f.o.b. 
unit values of (an) appropriate major exporter(s) adjusted by adding an estimate of 
insurance, freight and other costs to the importing country” (ibid., paragraph 4). 
Although the EU was a significant importer of raw sugar during the reference period, 
this sugar was primarily obtained from the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
states at preferential prices, and imports of sugar (whether white or raw) over the 
most-favoured-nation variable import levy were negligible. Thus the EU had no 
relevant c.i.f. unit values to deploy, and, as illustrated below, it looked to another 
source. 
As for the internal price, according to the modalities document this should 
“generally be a representative wholesale price ruling in the domestic market or an 
estimate of that price where adequate data is not available” (ibid., paragraph 6). 
What Did the EU Say It Would Do? 
I 
n March 1992, as required by the Dunkel text, the EU had submitted its market 
access offer. As reported in Agra Europe (20 March 1992), for white sugar the 
internal price over the base period was given as 719 ecu/tonne and the external price 
as 195 ecu/tonne,
2 giving a tariff equivalent of 524 ecu/tonne (equivalent to an ad 
valorem tariff of 268.7 percent). For raw sugar the internal price was given as 600 
ecu/tonne and the external price as 176 ecu/tonne, giving a tariff equivalent of 424 
ecu/tonne (240.9 percent). The footnotes suggest that, for sugar, the internal price was 
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the “intervention price + 10% + storage levy”, and the external price for raw sugar 
was derived from the New York bourse, while that for white sugar was taken from 
Paris. The following were the base rates of duty the EU entered into its tariff 
schedules at Marrakesh: 424 ecu/tonne for raw sugar for refining (reducing by 20 
percent to 339 ecu/tonne by the end of the implementation period) and 524 (down to 
419) for refined sugar. 
Similarly, in November 1992, following the U.S.-EU meeting at Blair House, the 
EU declared: “For the Community, the tariffs will be … equal to the difference 
between the world price (f.o.b.) of the product and its intervention price on the 
Community market, increased by 10% and by the monthly increments” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1992, 1). Table 2 of the same document reported that, 
for white sugar, the external reference price for 1986-88 was 195.0 ecu/tonne, 
resulting in a tariff equivalent of 524.0 ecu/tonne. This idea – that the EU’s internal 
price would be “the average Community support price (in most cases the intervention 
price) increased by 10%” – dates back to the EU’s GATT “offer” of November 1990 
(European Communities, 1990, 3).  
Thus the EU had made quite clear over a number of years how it intended to apply 
tariffication for sugar (and many other products as well). Whether or not its 
methodology  – particularly the intervention price plus 10 percent – really reflected 
the language of the modalities document is a moot point. But it is difficult to believe 
that other countries were not aware of the EU’s intent. Nonetheless, Nogués has 
suggested that one possible explanation for dirty tariffication is that “the notification 
of tariff equivalents to the WTO was made at the last minute before closing the UR. 
After many years of frustrating talks, negotiators were tired and wanted to end and 
close the round in spite of the fact that they sensed an outcome that was unbalanced 
against developing countries” (2003, 7). 
297 Percent? 
A 
s noted above, Ingco claims that the EU’s tariff equivalent equated to an ad 
valorem tariff of 297 percent. It is not clear whether this refers to white (refined) 
sugar, or raw sugar for refining. In fact the EU declared specific tariff equivalents of 
524 and 424 ecu/tonne, for white and raw sugar respectively, equivalent to ad valorem 
rates of 268.7 and 240.9 percent on the basis of the external prices notified by the EU. 
Either Ingco has used the wrong specific tariffs in her calculation (i.e., higher than 524 
or 424 ecu/tonne), or she used lower external prices than those declared by the EU. 
Given the specific tariffs fixed by the EU, the world market price determined by Ingco 
would have to be nearly 10 percent lower than that declared by the EU for white 
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sugar, and nearly 20 percent lower for raw sugar, if her estimate of 297 were to stand. 
This does not square easily with the suggestion that the EU engaged in dirty 
tariffication. 
Validating the EU’s Calculations 
T 
he inability to replicate Ingco’s figure of 297 percent does not, however, dismiss 
the claim that the EU engaged in dirty tariffication for sugar. Accordingly, in this 
section, an attempt is made to validate the EU’s calculations. The first task is to check 
the EU’s maths. A problem this immediately throws up is that of the green “money” 
system that operated in the EU until the early 1990s, and in particular the so-called 
switch-over mechanism, which applied from April 1984 until its abolition in 1995 
(Swinbank and Tanner, 1996).
3 By then the correcting coefficient had reached 
1.207509. Thus the EU’s intervention price for white sugar in 1994/95 was fixed at 
523.3 ecu/tonne, whereas that for 1995/96 was 631.9. This change did not reflect a 
real increase in support prices of nearly 21 percent, but simply that the agricultural 
ecu in which support prices had been expressed prior to the abolition of the switch-
over was worth 21 percent more than the commercial ecu in which they were now 
denominated. In preparing its GATT commitments the EU worked in commercial ecu, 
but this meant it had to convert from agricultural to commercial ecu using the 
appropriate correcting factor for the base period. The evidence suggests that the EU 
itself was confused. Ingco does not say how she dealt with this issue. 
Figure 2 summarises the EU’s support system for sugar.
4 An intervention price is 
fixed, which is valid throughout the marketing year (July to June). Although the EU 
has a net export surplus, intervention is very rare. This is so for two reasons. First, the 
European Commission manages the market through a regular tender to determine 
export refunds (subsidies), thus keeping market prices above the intervention price 
equivalent. Second, during the period under consideration (but not now) the EU 
operated a complex storage policy under which, when sugar processors sold white 
sugar (except to intervention), they paid a storage levy into a self-financing fund. This 
money was then used to pay, on a flat rate basis, the industry’s storage costs, and 
helped ensure that the EU’s surplus was kept in private stores before being exported. 
This also explains why the EU claimed that its effective support price was the 
intervention price plus the storage levy.  
The EU’s intervention price for white sugar throughout the period was unchanged 
at 541.8 agricultural ecu. For the present research, the correcting factor was applied to 
this on a daily basis, and a simple average intervention price of 604.0 commercial ecu 
over the three-year period 1986-88 was calculated. Similarly, after having added in the 
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storage levy charged, an average effective support price of 648.1 commercial 
ecu/tonne was calculated for the period. 
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Figure 2  Structure of price support for white sugar (ecu/tonne) 
Similar, but not necessarily the same, data were required to determine the 
aggregate measurement of support (AMS): an internal “applied administered price” 
and an external “reference price”. For white sugar the EU again referred to the Paris 
bourse for the external price, and declared a figure of 193.8 ecu/tonne, virtually the 
same as that declared for tariffication (Commission of the European Communities, 
1994: supporting table 6). For its “applied administered price” it took the intervention 
price. Table 1 compares calculated estimates from the present research with the EU’s 
declaration for its applied administered price. 
 
Table 1  Estimates and EU Figures for Applied Administered Price 
 
 EU  figure  Author’s 
estimate 
1986  609.9  583.3 
1987 616.2  612.5 
1988 616.2  616.2 
1986-88 614.1  604.0 
 
For 1988 the EU’s figure is replicated exactly. The EU’s figures for 1986 and 
1987 raise suspicions: the former seems to take little, and the latter no, account of the 
differences in the correcting factor compared to that for 1988. However, if the 
intervention price (541.8 agricultural ecu/tonne) is multiplied by the correcting factor 
valid from 15 January to 30 June 1987 (1.125696), the resulting figure is 609.9 
commercial ecu (as reported by the EU for 1986!). As illustrated below, these figures 
feed through into the tariffication calculation. 
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In undertaking tariffication, the EU took the intervention price augmented by 10 
percent, plus the storage levy, as its estimate of an internal price. The EU’s 
calculations were replicated and the results appear in table 2 (in commercial 
ecu/tonne). The applied administered price, reported above, was augmented by 10 
percent, and to it was added the storage levy, converted to commercial ecu using the 
same correcting factor used by the EU for that year. The final column of table 2 
reports the author’s calculation, which is the average daily rate for the calendar year, 
applying the appropriate data for the day.  
 
Table 2  Estimates for Internal Price 
 
  EU figure, as reported 








1986  716  715.9 686.0 
1987 724  723.3  719.0 
1988 718  717.6  720.4 
1986-88 719  718.9  708.5 
 
The estimates in columns three and four suggest then that the EU overstated its 
internal price by about 10 ecu/tonne, both for the AMS calculation and for 
tariffication. But was this dirty tariffication, or just sloppy arithmetic?  
In addition to the intervention price, a threshold price was also fixed. For the 
marketing years 1986/87 and 1987/88 this was 670.3 agricultural ecu/tonne. 
According to calculations done for the present research the average threshold price for 
the period was 745.6 commercial ecu/tonne.  
The variable import levy – which could be fixed on a daily basis if required – was 
designed to bridge the gap between the threshold price and the lowest world offer 
price. The Official Journal of the European Communities reports the import levy fixed 
for white sugar. For example, on 6 January 1986 it was fixed at 485.9 agricultural 
ecu/tonne. Over the three-year period 1986-88 the levy averages, on a daily basis, 547 
commercial ecu/tonne. This is virtually the same as the figure of 542 claimed by the 
EU in its “offer” of December 1990 (European Communities, 1990, annex II), 
validating the commission’s maths.  
Furthermore, there is (approximate) mathematical consistency. The difference 
between the threshold price (745.6) and the EU’s internal price (intervention, plus 10 
percent, plus storage levy: 708.5) is 37 ecu/tonne. This is a measure of the extent to 
which one would expect the variable import levy to exceed its tariff equivalent. The 
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present research suggests that the EU’s tariff equivalent of 524 ecu/tonne perhaps 
overstates the true figure by about 10 ecu/tonne. Contrast this “true” figure (514) with 
the average import levy reported in the previous paragraph (542/547), and the margin 
between the two is 28-33 ecu, much as might be expected. 
Thus it would appear that the data the EU has reported is (more-or-less) internally 
consistent; but has it used a representative world market price for its calculations? A 
world market price series for the EU was constructed by deducting the variable import 
levy from the threshold price, on a daily basis; monthly averages were then produced. 
These 36 data plots are reported by the solid line in figure 3. The average “world 
market price” for this series is 198.5 ecu/tonne, which – as one would expect from the 
forgoing discussion – corresponds to the 195 ecu/tonne the EU reported for 
tariffication. But more significantly, it also corresponds to the information the EU 
published at the time. In 1989 the commission reported from the Paris Bourse a price 
for white sugar (f.o.b. designated European ports, in new bags) of 173.1 ecu/tonne for 
the marketing year (July to June) 1986/87, and 184.3 ecu/tonne for the marketing year 
1987/88 (Commission of the European Communities, 1989, T/189). The derived 
series presented here, working back from the import levy, averages 178 and 185 for 



























Caribbean, bulk fob white, EU  
Figure 3  World market prices, ecu/tonne, monthly data, 1986-88, Caribbean bulk, 
                  f.o.b.; and European white. 
           Source: Caribbean bulk (f.o.b.) is monthly data from figure 1, converted to  
                 ecu using monthly ecu/$ exchange rates published in various issues of  
                 European Economy. Supplement A. 
                 White European is a series derived by the author by deducting on a daily  
                 basis the variable import levy from the threshold price and producing     
                 monthly averages. 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  64   A. Swinbank 
 
Figure 3 also re-presents (the dotted line) the monthly data from figure 1, showing 
the price of bulk sugar f.o.b. in Caribbean ports, converted to ecu using a monthly 
average exchange rate. Whilst clearly there is some correspondence between the two 
price series (the coefficient of correlation is 0.95), there are periods when the gap 
between the two narrows, and others when it widens. The average gap between the 
two series is 46 ecu/tonne (standard deviation 13.0). Whilst not validating the EU’s 
choice of world market price, this comparison does suggest it is a credible figure. 
Dirty Tariffication, the Bigger Picture 
A 
s noted above, tariff equivalents were determined for the base period 1986-88, 
with the new tariffs applied from 1995. To repeat, the EU determined a tariff 
equivalent of 524 ecu/tonne for white sugar. It committed itself to a 20 percent 
reduction, to reach a new bound rate of 419 ecu/tonne in 2000. This involved six 
annual reductions. Thus, on 1 July 1995 a tariff of 507 ecu/tonne came into force.  
However, by 1995 world market prices were higher than they had been in the base 
period. Thus the variable import levy that had been in force on 30 June 1995 was 
423.2 ecu/tonne. (Over the first six months of 1995 it had averaged 469.4 ecu/tonne.) 
Hence, tariffication resulted in a sharp increase in the import duty!  
This example may raise questions about the appropriateness of the 
implementation rules, and it may have contributed to a general unease that WTO 
members had collectively conspired to produce dirty tariffication; but it does not mean 
that the EU broke or bent the rules to achieve this outcome.  
The Bigger Problem: Special Safeguards 
The URAA allowed countries to retain yet additional protection. The Special 
Safeguard provisions are only available on those tariff lines that underwent 
tariffication. An additional duty can be imposed, on a consignment basis, if the c.i.f. 
import price falls below a reference or trigger price determined for the base period 
1986-88. This trigger price is the average c.i.f. import price recorded in that period. 
Imports into the EU were dominated by preferential shipments from the ACP states. 
Accordingly the EU has determined trigger prices of 413 and 531 ecu/tonne for raw 
and white sugar respectively. This has meant that the Special Safeguard provisions for 
sugar imports into the EU have been permanently invoked since the implementation 
of tariffication in 1995.
5 
Article 5(5) of the URAA sets out a formula to determine the additional duty. It 
kicks in when the offer price falls 10 percent below the trigger price, and then 
increases progressively as the world market price falls. An offer price of 195 
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ecu/tonne – the figure used by the EU for tariffication – would trigger an additional 
duty of 113 ecu/tonne. 
Thus the reality is that the combined effects of tariffication and the Special 
Safeguard provisions did not create a fixed tariff. Instead they conspired to perpetuate 
a variable import levy regime. The ad valorem equivalent of the tariff equivalent, and 
the additional duty payable at the world market price that resulted in that tariff 
equivalent, taken together, is 327 percent. It may be that Ingco took some account of 
the Special Safeguard provisions in her calculations; but she does not say so, and 
again it is not clear how to replicate her figures. 
The URAA provided for the reduction of tariffs, but it made no provision for the 
phased reduction of the Special Safeguard mechanisms. They “remain in force for the 
duration of the reform process” (Article 5(9)). It is beyond the scope of the present 
article to speculate on the future of Article 5, other than to note that if its provisions 
(and trigger prices) remain unchanged it will remain a significant trade barrier. 
Conclusions 
T 
he purpose of this article was not to defend the EU’s policy for sugar, or the EU’s 
position in the URAA. Instead its purpose was to examine the widely held view 
that dirty tariffication was an important characteristic of the URAA. With regard to 
EU sugar little evidence was found to support that claim. The EU’s calculations were 
validated, but the figures here do suggest that the EU overstated the internal price, and 
hence its tariff equivalent, by about 10 ecu/tonne. Whether this was deliberate 
manipulation of the data (i.e., dirty tariffication), or arithmetical error, is difficult to 
determine; but I tend to the latter view. Nonetheless, the tariff equivalent was lower 
than the average of the daily import levies that had been set in 1986-88. 
This detailed examination of the EU’s tariffication process for sugar illustrates 
two structural characteristics of the URAA, the implications of which may not have 
been fully obvious to negotiators at the time. First, a significant time lag between the 
reference period for determining tariff equivalents (1986-88) and the date of 
implementation of the new fixed tariffs (1995) meant that circumstances could (and 
did) change. For the EU this meant that the import tariff chargeable on sugar from 
July 1995 was substantially higher than the variable import levy that had applied 
immediately prior to that date, and that it would not be until well into the 
implementation period that tariff cuts would be achieved. This is a generic issue that 
could have arisen in any country for any product subject to tariffication. 
The second structural characteristic concerns the Special Safeguard clause. This 
could, of course, be invoked for any tariff line that had been subject to tariffication; 
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but in a number of instances – the EU’s preferential imports of ACP sugar is one 
notable case – this did allow considerable additional border protection to remain. 
Thus, since 1995, in addition to the most-favoured-nation tariff on sugar, the EU has 
had the ability to apply an additional duty. Overall the EU’s border protection for 
sugar remained prohibitively high, and only imports under preferential arrangements 
were able to penetrate the EU’s market. Thus negotiators in the Doha Development 
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Endnotes 
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1.  The modalities document is not however a legal text. It notes that it was issued on 
the understanding that it could “not be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
proceedings” (GATT, 1993, 1). Thus, post-Marrakesh, it would be difficult for 
aggrieved WTO members to challenge tariff bindings even though dirty 
tariffication could be shown to have occurred. 
2.  Agra Europe reports 196, but that figure is changed in this article to 195 to be 
consistent with other documents. In its GATT “offer” of November 1990, the EU 
had reported external prices for white and raw sugar of 195 and 176 ecu/tonne 
respectively (Commission of the European Communities, 1990). 
3.  Intervention and other CAP support prices were fixed in ecu, now the euro. When 
the exchange rate of national currencies moved against the ecu this should have 
produced an immediate change in support prices in national currencies (a situation 
that persists for non-Euroland currencies today). The green money system was an 
attempt to secure domestic price stability by delaying these price changes, even 
though this meant support prices across the EU were no longer common. From 
time to time the conversion rates used to translate support prices (expressed in ecu) 
into national currencies were amended, but often with a considerable lag. 
“Devaluations” of green conversion rates – which increased support prices in the 
country concerned – were easier to secure than were “revaluations” – which 
resulted in price cuts. The “switch-over” mechanism introduced an asymmetric 
system. Now if a currency was revalued against the ecu, the common price level 
was, in effect, increased by the same amount so that support prices in the revaluing 
country need not fall; this left scope also for other member states to “devalue” their 
green conversion rates, thus securing a price increase for their farmers 
4.  Entitlement to price support is limited by quota. Figure 2 applies to A and B sugar, 
which can be sold in the EU or receive an export refund. A producer levy is 
charged (usually at a higher rate on B sugar), which reduces the net return to sugar 
refiners. C sugar must be exported from the EU without recourse to (direct) 
subsidy. 
5.  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1423/95 of 23 June 1995, laying down detailed 
rules for the import of products in the sugar sector other than molasses, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L 141, 24 June 1995.  
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